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Abstract 
Due to two-sidedness and network effects, digital platforms face a coordination problem to attract 
producers and consumers upon launch. Scholars have suggested launch strategies for solving this prob-
lem with only limited empirical evidence. In this paper, we relate to the strategies of sequential and sim-
ultaneous entry of consumers and producers. We conducted a qualitative study interviewing 14 founders 
and CEOs of digital platforms. We used an analysis of 1st and 2nd order concepts to relate the emerging 
data to existing theory. We observe that the ability to switch between the producer and consumer side, 
(i.e., being producer in one transaction and consumer in another one), has so far remained unexplored 
in the platform literature despite its importance for the implementation of launch strategies. Our findings 
suggest that digital platforms with switching sides implement a simultaneous entry strategy, whereas 
digital platforms without switching sides implement a sequential entry strategy. We conclude by provid-
ing implications for researchers, entrepreneurs, and investors and by giving directions for future re-
search. 
Keywords: Digital platform, Chicken-and-egg problem, Launch strategy, Critical mass 
1 Introduction 
Physical marketplaces are moving into a virtual space, where they are also known as digital platforms. 
(Yoo et al. 2010). The economic potential of digital platforms has been demonstrated by a number of 
companies, such as Apple, Google, Facebook, Alibaba and more recently Uber, Airbnb and WeChat. 
However, despite these successful examples, scholars have acknowledged strategic challenges to launch 
platforms. Digital platforms face a coordination problem to attract producers and consumers in the first 
place (Evans and Schmalensee 2016, Parker et al. 2016). A central issue to the launch of digital platforms 
is caused by a two-sidedness of the market and cross-side network effects, which lead to the question of 
how to get both sides on the platform to trigger interactions (Boudreau and Hagiu 2009, Katz and Shapiro 
1994, Rochet and Tirole 2003). A digital platform can only provide value if producers and consumers 
interact. Moreover, the participation of one side depends on the presence of the other side (Boudreau and 
Hagiu 2009, Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010, Parker and Van Alstyne 2005). In the literature, this phenom-
enon is sometimes referred to as the chicken-and-egg problem of launching digital platforms (Caillaud 
and Jullien 2003, Hagiu 2006, Rochet and Tirole 2003). Founders of platforms need to carefully assess 
which side of the platform market is more important to address when launching the platform to initiate 
interaction and hence the creation of value (Van Alstyne et al. 2016a).  
Evans (2009) recognizes the well-developed research body on mature platforms regarding complex pric-
ing strategies. However, he raises the issue of persisting little attention that scholars pay to the actual 
launch of such platforms—even though successful launch and consequent viability of the business are 
imperative for research questions that concern mature platforms. In fact, most platforms fail because they 
do not succeed to solve the coordination problem between producers and consumers in a timely man-
ner—Google Video and Yahoo Video are just two prominent examples (Webster and Evans 2016). To 
survive, platforms need to reach a critical mass of producers and consumers at a given time (Evans and 
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Schmalensee 2016). Hence, the benefits drawn from an optimal pricing strategies remain unrealized if 
the launch phase is not designed to solve the initial coordination problem and to reach critical mass. Still, 
only a thin body of research describes strategic decisions taken before the launch to reach critical mass 
(see for example Cusumano and Gawer 2002, Eisenmann et al. 2006, Ondrus et al. 2015). Existing 
research proposes various strategies that aim at igniting interactions between users (i.e., producers and 
consumers of products or services), and that can be distinguished with regards to the entry order of users 
(Evans 2009, Parker et al. 2016). However, most of the discussion on launch strategies of digital plat-
forms is purely conceptual. Only few strategies are supported by real-life cases (see for example Mas and 
Radcliffe 2011). Hence, the discussed launch strategies have rarely been empirically examined. 
Evans (2009) points out that the dynamics of the coordination problem may vary depending on the 
nature of the platform business, which therefore determines the suitable launch strategy. However, the 
impact of the nature of the platform businesses on the choice of strategies is still unexplored. An eval-
uation of individual strategies or possible restrictions in their application regarding the platform context 
has not yet been made. Thus, the aim of this paper is to investigate how these strategies, which solve the 
initial coordination problem between producers and consumers, are applied in different settings. We 
empirically examine launch strategies of digital platforms in their specific context. 
The unit of analysis is a selection of digital platforms launched between 2003 and 2016. They operate 
in different contexts and enable different interactions between their respective producer and consumer 
sides. The focus was on the strategies that solve the initial coordination problem. The data comprises 14 
interviews with founders and CEOs. The material was analyzed by formulating first and second order 
concepts (Van Maanen 1979).  
This study makes several contributions: First, the study is based on the empirical analysis of online start- 
ups rather than established firms, to follow the call by Evans (2009). Start-ups usually do not have the 
time or the financial resources to solve the coordination problem through a massive marketing campaign 
and do not have the history and reputation of an established brand. Although scholars recognize that 
context has an impact on the coordination problem, its implications have not yet been investigated. By 
looking at the contexts of different platforms rather than at a single one, we can generalize and 
build theory. Second, as the existence of a one-size-fits-all strategy is very unlikely, a categorization of 
platforms with regard to strategic implications is needed. Excluding unsuitable strategies ex-ante allows 
to save resources for more effective strategies. As an outcome of the data analysis we propose a new set 
of platform categories based upon users’ ability to switch between the producer and consumer side. Our 
findings suggest that users’ ability to switch sides is a key contingency factor for the suitability of 
different launch strategies. Further, our research is of significance for entrepreneurs and investors, who 
aim to avoid platform failure at an early stage. Even though the value proposition and technology are 
critical, both remain valueless without a network of interacting users. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss properties of digital 
platforms and review the coordination problem of producers and consumers as well as launch strategies 
of digital platforms. We then categorize the status quo of strategies in the literature according to the order 
of entry. Section 3 describes the methods of data collection and analysis. Section 4 outlines the results. 
Section 5 discusses the results and provides theoretical and managerial implications. 
2 Theoretical background 
2.1 Digital platforms 
Scholars have been framing different dimensions of digital platforms, leading to a widely-dispersed re-
search body (Porch et al. 2015, Thomas et al. 2014) and ambiguous positions among practitioners and 
academics (Sørensen et al. 2015). Scholars have been classifying platforms according to different criteria 
such as business models (Boudreau and Lakhani 2008), social interaction structures (Spagnoletti et al. 
2015), ownership and sponsorship structures (Eisenmann et al. 2008), market models (Armstrong 2006), 
and organizational forms (Gawer and Cusumano 2014). Moreover, much research has been done on the 
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implementation of pricing strategies (Boudreau and Hagiu 2009, Rochet and Tirole 2003, Tan et al. 2005, 
Ambrus and Argenziano 2009), which are not sufficient to predict the viability of digital platforms.  
Our study relies on the integrative view on digital platforms suggested by Gawer (2014) and Hanseth 
and Lyytinen (2010), who emphasize the technical and economic characteristics of a platform, where the 
management of heterogeneous IT capabilities allows for interaction among a variety of actors. The prin-
cipal task of the platform is to establish a direct access to a common marketplace for producers and 
consumers (Hagiu 2007) by providing them with the necessary tools (Parker and Van Alstyne 2005).  
The physical product of the platform requires the use of a digital device such as a computer or smartphone 
to interact in the social sphere (Yoo et al. 2010). The physical platform further is an “extensible codebase 
of a software-based system that provides core functionality shared by the modules that interoperate with 
it” (Tiwana et al. 2010, p. 676). Modularity renders the platform scalable, which allows an increase of 
output without input by the platform provider, generative, flexible and recursive (Tilson et al. 2010), by 
further expanding a firms’ boundaries (Tiwana et al. 2010). Traditional businesses face a limited ability 
to create such generativity due to company-internal constraints and gatekeepers (Evans and Schmalensee 
2016, Yoo et al. 2010). The combination of stability and variety enables a platform to evolve and adapt 
according to its environment and to unexpected growth (Baldwin and Woodard 2008, Wareham et al. 
2014). Despite the fragmented literature on platforms, Baldwin and Woodard (2008) have emphasized 
one common aspect among all interpretations: “The conservation or reuse of a core component to achieve 
economies of scale, while reducing the cost of creating a wide variety of complementary components” 
(p. 3). In the economic viewpoint of platforms, the stable point in the architecture is the common place 
of interaction, which may be a physical location, contractual or technical convention (Baldwin and 
Woodard 2008). The interaction between producers and consumers takes place online or offline, but the 
initial match is induced in the digital environment (Parker et al. 2016). The viability of a digital platform 
requires a critical mass of volume or value. Once a critical mass has been reached, network effects 
emerge and ignition is triggered (Fichman 2004). The quality of the platform depends on the contribution 
of other users (Bhargava 2014). Unlike in traditional businesses, the value that can be reaped from oper-
ations on a platform is not fixed (Zhu and Furr 2016), since it increases with every joining participant 
(Van Alstyne 2016b). 
Exchanges on a platform enable reduced transaction and search costs, and a more efficient allocation of 
resources (Rochet and Tirole 2003, Thomas et al. 2014). Airbnb and Uber are famous examples for the 
potential success of such innovative business model. In this paper, we use the terms platform and digital 
platform interchangeably. 
2.2 Coordination problem 
Due to the two-sidedness and network effects a digital platform faces a coordination problem of pro-
ducers and consumers upon its launch. This coordination problem is based on two phenomena: i) lack of 
users and ii) lack of interactions. Firstly, due to cross-side network effects, the value of the platform to 
user on side A is affected by the number of users on side B (Katz and Shapiro 1994). With the absence 
of users on one side, incoming users on the other side do not have an incentive to join either. Secondly, 
upon the launch of the platform users cannot find any content or activity, hence they cannot use the 
platform as intended. Thus, they are not willing to invest in further engagement and no value is 
created (Choudary 2015). If this problem is not solved, a vicious cycle unfolds and the platform 
continues to lack users and activity (Choudary 2015). To solve this problem, the platform needs to 
consider the limited timeframe. A platform that does not attract a sufficiently large audience in a certain 
period becomes less attractive to those participants who have already joined. As a result, they are likely to 
leave the platform. Evans (2009) calls this the “ignition phase of the product launch process.” Conse-
quently, a timely acquisition of both producers and consumers is required to start interactions between 
them. 
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2.3 Launch strategies 
Prior work recognizes the impact of the nature of the platform on the choice of launch strategy about 
the entry order of users (Evans 2009). The underlying coordination problem can be solved sequentially, 
such that the platform gets one side on board before the other (Evans 2009, Parker et al. 2016). Or else, 
the coordination problem can be addressed simultaneously, such that users of both sides, i.e., producers 
and consumers, are present from the start (Evans 2009, Parker et al. 2016). Prior work suggests that the 
type of platform and thus the specific nature of the coordination problem determine whether a platform 
needs to seek a simultaneous or a sequential entry of its users (Evans 2009). 
Two recent publications distill launch strategies without focusing on the above-mentioned distinction of 
sequence (Evans 2009, Parker et al. 2016). We aggregate the proposed launch strategies from platform 
literature and propose a classification according to the users’ order of entry (see Table 1)1. 
Strategy Properties Order of Entry Source 
Two-step Platform providers capture only one side of users 
before addressing the other side. This only works if 
the first side does not value the presence of the other 
side.  
Sequential Evans 2009 
Single-side Platform providers offer benefits to only one set 
of users. Once these are attracted, the business can 
be transformed into a platform by inviting the sec-
ond set of users, who wish to interact with the first 
set. 
Sequential Parker et al. 2016 
Commitment/Subsidy One side of users receives financial guarantees when 
it is asked to make investments. 
Sequential Parker et al. 2016 
Seeding/Self-supply The platform itself creates value units by acting as 
a first producer to attract a set of potential consum-
ers. Once they have joined the platform, other pro-
ducers arrive who wish to interact with them. 
Sequential Evans and Schma-
lensee 2016, Par-
ker et al. 2016 
Producer evangelism A platform can be designed in a way that allows pro-
ducers to bring their consumers to the platform. This 
strategy is common among crowdfunding platforms: 
Project founders are incentivized to actively seek for 
investors. A platform may call producers to install a 
visual sign in form of a button on their website, which 
indicates that they are part of the platform’s ecosys-
tem. Thereby the customers will be directed to the 
platform. 
Sequential Evans and Schma-
lensee 2016, Par-
ker et al. 2016 
Single-marquee A platform provider starts by onboarding selected 
users, which are valuable to the prospective net-
work: They are particularly appreciated by the 
crowd or influence others, which results in more us-
ers joining. Those marquee users can trigger direct 
and indirect network effects, when announced to the 
network. A single marquee is to be found on only one 
side. 
Sequential Evans 2009, Par-
ker et al. 2016 
Big-bang The simultaneous onboarding of producers and con-
sumers may be initiated by several classic push mar-
keting means, triggering a high volume of awareness 
towards the platform. 
Simultaneous Parker et al. 2016 
1 Gawer (2009) distinguishes further between coring and tipping strategies. Since this paper deals with the establishment of plat-
forms, we solely focus on coring strategies. 
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Micromarket The launch starts in a small market, where partici-
pants already interact with each other, allowing an ef-
fective matching of interactions and the achievement 
of a critical mass within a smaller scope. The activity 
can later be scaled towards a bigger market. A micro-
market can be a community within the overall target 
group as well as a geographic market. 
Simultaneous Parker et al. 2016 
Piggyback Platforms start by addressing an existing community 
of users, which is already present on another platform. 
They are then directed to their own platform. 
Simultaneous Parker et al. 2016 
Zig-zag Platform providers incrementally build a customer 
base on both sides through alternating marketing ef-
forts to either side. Due to indirect network effects, 
the platform gains additional value with every new 
step. 
Simultaneous Evans 2009, Evans 
and Schmalensee 
2016 
Double-marquee Like the single marquee strategy, a platform pro-
vider starts by onboarding selected, particularly val-
uable users. In a double marquee-strategy—as op-
posed to the single marque-strategy—a platform 
seeks for outstanding users on both sides. 
Simultaneous Evans 2009 
Table 1. Launch strategies and their properties
3 Method 
To extend the existing theory on launch strategies of platforms we carried out a qualitative study, which 
is informed by the extant literature on launch strategies of digital platforms. Figure 1 shows the re-
search process we adopted. We seek to inductively generate new theory by conducting expert interviews 
with founders of digital platforms. The procedure serves to “discover relevant concepts for the purpose 
of theory building that can guide the creation and validation of constructs” (Gioia et al. 2013, p. 16). 
Within the scope of this research, there was no well-defined research hypothesis set up before the data 
collection, as its relevance is only to be confirmed by the emerging data (Gioia et al. 2013). The study was 
conducted based on the ground assumption that the organization, i.e., the digital platform, is socially con-
structed and that the people, who are in charge of its construction, are “knowledgeable agents” (Gioia et 
al. 2013., p. 17). This means they know what they try to achieve and are able to clarify the reasoning behind 
it. It is assumed that the founders consciously or unconsciously apply strategies that aim at solving the 
coordination problem. Further, we suppose that the strategies were implemented to prevent failure during 
and after the launch phase. 
  Figure 1. Research process 
The digital platforms were selected after a search on the database Crunchbase. Generally, we aimed at 
learning about a broad variety of launch strategies with regard to the order of entry. We therefore focused 
on all types of platforms that exhibit a triangular structure, connecting a consumer side and a producer 
side. We restricted our data collection to two European countries. 
The data were collected in expert interviews and through capturing secondary data. The semi-structured 
interviews were conducted in May and June 2016. As the research question addresses the respective 
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launch strategy of each digital platform, the founders of the businesses were selected as interview part-
ners whenever possible. In one case, where the founders had already left the company, it was ensured 
that the CEO was familiar with the start-up phase, even though the CEO had not worked for the company 
during that specific time. All interviews were conducted via a videoconference tool. The duration of the 
interviews were 30 minutes on average. 
In total, the data set is comprised of 14 expert interviews with founders and CEOs of digital platforms. 
In line with a suggestion by Yin (2009), the conducted interviews were written up as thoroughly as 
possible and subsequently sent out to the respondents for correction and confirmation. In sum, the in-
terview protocols deliver more than 41,000 words of qualitative data. To gain insights into real-time ac-
counts in addition to the retrospective view from the interviews, multiple data sources, e.g., companies’ 
websites or mobile applications, were consulted (Gioia et al. 2013). 
One of the goals of this study is to reinforce empirical substantiation in the field of launch strategies of 
digital platforms. To ensure the fit of existing theory with emerging data from the real world we constantly 
reiterated between literature and collected data (Eisenhardt 1989, Glaser and Strauss 1967, Yin 2009). 
The analysis was conducted using the qualitative data analysis software RQDA and by systematically ap-
plying an analysis of 1st and 2nd order concepts (Van Maanen 1979). The 1st order analysis allows a 
coding according to the terms and notions used by the experts (e.g., “low hanging fruits”), whereas the 
2nd order analysis stems from researcher-centric thinking (e.g., “first joiners”). This “tandem reporting of 
both voices” (Gioia et al. 2013, p. 18) allows a rigorous link between the collected data, existent research 
literature, and the evolving propositions (Gioia et al. 2013). The link between the existent literature and 
collected data is shown in Figure 2. 
Conducting an open coding process (Strauss 1987) and sticking to the experts’ vocabulary, the 1st order 
analysis allowed to identify potentially important themes and phenomena (Glaser and Strauss 1967). 
However, it also yielded an unmanageable variety of codes. Hence, axial coding (Corbin and Strauss 
2008) was conducted looking for similarities and differences among the codes to create overarching 
categories. Axial coding aims at identifying conditions under which concepts may take place (Corbin 
and Strauss 2008). Hence, the categorization of the numerous codes into fewer groups of codes using the 
Gioia methodology allowed to detect the dominant strategic elements (see Figure 3, Gioia et al. 2013). 
The coding of the transcribed interviews and the data structures allowed for an in-depth qualitative 
assessment and the clear identification of variations between cases. 
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 Figure 2. Inversed data structure 
4 Results 
The examined platforms serve a variety of market segments (see Table 2). Among the examined platforms, 
five platforms enabled interactions between businesses and individuals (business-to-consumer or B2C), 
five platforms enabled interactions among businesses (business-to-business or B2B), and four platforms 
linked individuals (peer-to-peer or P2P). The value propositions differ, except for two, as two business 
models were represented twice: BLOGSEARCH1 and BLOGSEARCH2 connect bloggers and readers. 
RENTOFFICE1 and RENTOFFICE2 link companies which have spare office space to other companies, 
which look for a flexible solution to rent an office. However, the platforms operate in geographically 
distinct markets.  
 Figure 3. Data structure with 1st and 2nd order codes 
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Platform Activity Consumer Producer 
BLOGSEARCH1 Blog search engine Reader Blogger 
BLOGSEARCH2 Blog search engine Reader Blogger 
BOOKDOCTOR Online appointment booking Patient Doctor 
CARSHARE Car sharing Individual Individual 
EXPAND Consulting Start-up Expert 
LEND Crowdlending SME Individual 
PAY Mobile payment Individual Merchant 
RENTITEM Marketplace for physical goods Individual Individual 
RENTOFFICE1 Office sharing Business Business 
RENTOFFICE2 Office sharing Business Business 
RENTSTORE Marketplace for promotion 
locations 
Business Landlord 
STUDY Online survey tool Market Research Institute Individual 
TASKSHARE Marketplace for freelance workers Getter Giver 
WEDDING Marketplace for wedding planners Bridal Couple Wedding vendor 
Table 2. Description of studied platforms 
4.1 Launch strategies and side switching 
All platforms used a combination of different launch strategies (see Table 3). During each interview one 
strategy emerged as the crucial one, which all other strategic actions were based upon. We classified the 
platforms according to the users’ order of entry and we conducted an analysis of the different platform 
contexts in each category. Strikingly, the platforms in the respective categories differed according to one 
characteristic: the ability to switch between the user sides. On some platforms, user sides remain restricted 
to one side. The major part of platforms that implemented a sequential entry strategy constrain their users 
to being either consumer or producer (i.e., side switching “No” in Table 3). The case of BOOKDOCTOR 
is a good example. The platform allows individuals to make appointments with physicians who have the 
booking system installed. Another example is WEDDING, which connects the providers of wedding-
related services with bridal couples. The examined platforms are aggregators of a professional group, for 
instance doctors, or organizations, like start-ups or SMEs. The producer side usually supplies a good, 
service or information, which is not freely available to the public, but core to the group of producers. 
On other platforms, user sides can act both as producer and consumer (i.e., side switching “Yes” in Table 
3). Most platforms that applied a simultaneous entry strategy allow users to switch from one side to the 
other. To do so, the user groups need to belong to the same market segment. This means that the platforms 
with switching user groups serve either a B2B market or a P2P market. For instance, CARSHARE is a 
peer-to-peer car lending platform. Its fleet consists of vehicles of the participating car owners. The founder 
of TASKSHARE, an online marketplace matching freelance workforce with local demand, points out: “A 
person can be both. It's not Uber, where you either drive or ride. Here you can do both. (…) So, the default 
thing, when you open the app, is about ‘Who around me needs help?’ But in the same breath you can post 
that you need help.”  
Table 4 conceptualizes the distinction between platforms with and without switching user sides, which 
emerged as an important contingency factor for the choice of launch strategies. 
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Platform Key Strategy Order of Entry Side Switching 
BLOGSEARCH1 Producer evangelism Sequential No 
BLOGSEARCH2 Seeding Sequential No 
BOOKDOCTOR Producer evangelism Sequential No 
CARSHARE Micromarket with self-supply Simultaneous Yes 
EXPAND Two-step Sequential No 
LEND Zig-zag Simultaneous No 
PAY Single-marquee Sequential No 
RENTITEM Two-step Sequential Yes 
RENTOFFICE1 Piggybacking with self-supply Simultaneous Yes 
RENTOFFICE2 Micromarket with self-supply Simultaneous Yes 
RENTSTORE Seeding Sequential No 
STUDY Two-step Sequential No 
TASKSHARE Micromarket with self-supply Simultaneous Yes 
WEDDING Single-side Sequential No 
Table 3.  Entry strategies and side switching 
Platforms with switching sides Platforms without switching sides 
Allow users to switch easily, repeatedly and at no 
costs 
Constrain users to being either consumer or producer 
Users must be part of the same market segment: 
Business-to-business (B2B), peer-to-peer (P2P) 
The market segment is not significant 
Enable a P2P market, the re-distribution of 
costs, or a collaborative lifestyle 
Aggregate a professional group of users or 
organizations 
Table 4.  Platforms with and without switching sides 
4.2 Platforms with switching user sides 
Digital platforms whose users can switch sides launched both sides simultaneously to grow organically. 
For instance, RENTOFFICE2 started onboarding both sides within its own existing network of start-ups. 
As these start-ups were already interacting for other purposes, RENTOFFICE2 built on this network to 
establish first interactions for the purpose of office sharing. The start in a micromarket is particularly 
useful when producers and consumers meet physically in the context of an interaction. In the case of 
RENTOFFICE1 and RENTOFFICE2 both sides would share an office if the interaction was successful. 
The interactions on CARSHARE equally build on physical proximity of users. The peer-to-peer car shar-
ing platform “(…) started in one location. So, at the very beginning we focused on airports.” Similarly, 
TASKSHARE connects a local community: “We go into the markets, or plug into gyms, schools, 
churches. Where are people from the neighborhood already gathering? I think, that's one thing to go into 
the existing communities.” Users who experienced successful interactions in this micromarket may then 
spread to an adjacent area and allow the platform to scale. Otherwise platform providers begin targeting 
new geographic markets. This procedure may be sustained by the analysis of data: “When (…) we started 
to open locations—we analyzed the flow of our travelers, where the travelers were going. (…) Because we 
wanted to build a network following the main flows.” (CARSHARE) Having both sides physically 
present in one location increases the chances of a successful interaction, enhances the efficiency of 
matchmaking and avoids that the invested effort fizzles (Parker et al. 2016). 
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RENTOFFICE1 used the piggybacking launch strategy, which allows to draw a concentrated prospec-
tive user base from another platform towards the own platform. “We focus first on the low hanging 
fruits. Those who are present on other platforms. The platforms that normally provide other things. For 
example, people offer their offices on eBay classifieds” (RENTOFFICE1). If a platform is not particu-
larly created for matching office providers with renters, they are perceived as inefficient by users. This 
makes the onboarding of the individuals towards the specialized platform easier. RENTOFFICE1 on the 
other hand may find a concentrated and heterogeneous producer base on the generic platform, who can 
be redirected to its own platform. Further, RENTOFFICE1 used other online platforms to promote its 
supply side to guide demand towards its own service. 
Four of the five interviewed platforms with switching user groups implemented the self-supply strategy. 
The strategy solves the problem of lack of initial activity and reduces the uncertainty about the func-
tioning of the platform (Parker et al. 2016). This strategy avoids early joiners to think “Hey, there is 
nothing on there.“ (RENTOFFICE1) In the examined cases, the founders refer to the help of family and 
friends next to their own engagement: “If they [demand-side] send me an email, I will come and help 
them (…) So what I am trying at the moment is—without the app, without any technology—to get first 
of all getters on board by me saying ‘I am a giver. What do you need?’” (TASKSHARE). In the case 
of CARSHARE, the first cars were provided by the founders and their family members: “It was to (…) 
ensure the availability and to start.” RENTOFFICE1 and RENTOFFICE2 used contacts from former 
business operations to start first interactions. The self-supply strategy was solely applied by platforms 
with switching sides, because the value unit is a good or service which could be supplied by the platform. 
Taken together, our empirical analysis suggests that platforms with switching user sides tend to get users 
on board simultaneously to reinforce network effects and enable faster ignition (see Figure 4). They 
implement a simultaneous entry strategy for three reasons. First, users are potentially the same on both 
sides. This is why a distinction between producer and consumer side is generally not made and prospec-
tive users are considered as potential producers as well as consumers. Second, a platform does not know 
upfront which side a user will engage in first and is therefore advised to promote engagement on both 
sides equally. This rules out that a prospective user is targeted on the wrong side: Even if a company is 
not looking for a free office space when targeted by RENTOFFICE, it may well be possible that it has 
some space available for rental. Third, a user who acts as producer and consumer simultaneously creates 
two-fold indirect network effects for the entire network and therefore allows for faster ignition of the 
platform. This leads to our first proposition. 
Proposition 1: Simultaneous entry strategies are especially suitable for platforms with switching user 
sides. 
Figure 4.  Simultaneous entry of a platform with switching user sides 
4.3 Platforms without switching user sides 
Among the non-switching platforms, a sequential strategy was applied to solve the coordination problem. 
Hence the strategy targeted either the consumer side or the producer side first. This was possible because 
one side could extract value from the platform without the other side. 
To attract the first side, WEDDING applied the single-side strategy by creating an informational blog for 
consumers before it attracted the producer side and turned the business into a platform. “Strategically,  
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because we are obviously not really well funded. We are not a start-up that raised a million and is then 
able to throw a lot of money to Google AdWords or to social media. (…) On the contrary, we had to 
grow very organically, which is a bigger challenge.” The consumers could therefore extract value from 
the blog. Then, with enough consumers, the producer-side would be willing to pay a subscription fee. 
The founder of EXPAND recognized the difficulty to onboard both sides simultaneously and conse-
quently faced the question of which side to onboard first. The founder stated that “it was easier to delay 
the start-ups’ problems by telling them that we would find experts.” Hence, the platform addressed first 
its consumers (i.e., start-ups), and presented the cases to prospective producers (i.e., experts). The experts 
were onboarded on the demand of start-ups. 
When the platforms focused on the onboarding of the producer side first, they either simulated fake 
demand (RENTSTORE) or offered financial subsidies (BLOGSEARCH2). BLOGSEARCH2 offered 
its first bloggers a free premium membership for two weeks upon its launch. Only after an adequate 
number of bloggers had joined the platform, the attention turned toward the consumer side. 
BLOGSEARCH1 implemented the producer evangelism strategy. The platform asked its bloggers to 
install a button on their blog, which redirects the readers to BLOGSEARCH1. Further, the bloggers 
naturally attracted their readers to the platform through their activity: “Something which worked well 
in the beginning. Many bloggers talked about us. This was positive for the launch” (BLOGSEARCH1). 
PAY started by recruiting marquee users (i.e., influential students), to test and promote their service. 
Once the marquee users had convinced more students on their side, PAY observed a natural trend of 
evangelism. The individuals expressed to merchants their wish to be able to pay their purchases with 
PAY. Merchants then asked PAY to install a point-of-sale in the respective shop. Similarly, physicians 
on BOOKDOCTOR were incentivized to guide their patients towards the booking platform. Physicians 
on BOOKDOCTOR refer to the platform on their answering machines, when the doctor’s office is not 
occupied. 
However, the producer evangelism strategy was only observed among the platforms without switching 
user sides. This may be because these platforms primarily represent additional sales channels of the pro-
ducers’ core business operations. It distinguishes them from platforms with switching user sides, where 
also individuals sign up who would not even know the addressable group on the other side without the 
infrastructure of the platform. 
One start-up had sufficient financial means at its disposal to acquire the respective users. STUDY con-
centrated on the acquisition of the producer side (i.e., individuals), through Facebook ad targeting. This 
was only possible because the individuals valued to support a charity organization whilst answering sur-
veys. The market research institutes that would be interested in the collected data were only approached 
when the initial acquisition of individuals had proved to be successful. As the model appeared to be 
value creating, further market research institutes were targeted. Only upon their demand, STUDY 
onboarded new individuals and hence grew its customer base. 
Platforms without switching user sides tend to implement a sequential entry strategy. Platforms without 
switching user sides get users on board sequentially (Figure 5) for two reasons. First, the interviewed 
platforms without switching user sides offer producers to distribute their core product or service in an 
additional sales channel. Due to existing other sales channels, they are reassured about their consumers’ 
existence and only need to wait until they arrive on the corresponding platform. Hence, producers may 
be more patient to wait for the arrival of the consumer side. In the meantime, platforms make sure that 
the first side has nothing to lose while waiting for the second side. Second, the goal of a sequential entry 
strategy is to build up a solid mass of users on one side, which attracts the opposite side. This allows to 
establish successful interactions as soon as the second side arrives. Initial successful interactions are 
particularly important. User who do not find what they are looking for in the first place are unlikely to 
come back a second time. 
Proposition 2: Sequential entry strategies are especially suitable for platforms without switching user 
sides. 
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Figure 5.   Sequential entry of a platform without switching user sides 
5 Discussion 
Our goal was to refine the existing theory on the initial coordination problem from a strategic perspec-
tive and to enhance existing theory with empirical findings. Solving the coordination problem during the 
launch phase is crucial for the success of a digital platform. Platforms are only able to reach a critical 
mass of users if interactions between the first joiners can be initiated rapidly. To analyze the launch 
phase, we investigated the launch strategies of 14 digital platforms. As a result, we state that the relation-
ships of user groups are decisive for the implementation of a sequential or simultaneous entry strategy. 
Platforms with switching user sides tend to onboard both sides simultaneously, whereas platforms with-
out switching user sides did so sequentially. 
As a potential limitation of our findings, it is important to note that the ground for our analysis was 
generated through founders’ retrospective sensemaking of past actions and experiences, which may be 
subject to ambiguity (Weick et al. 2005). It is also important to note that we found two exceptions that 
did not follow the propose order of addressing user groups. RENTITEM and LEND relied on external 
financial means during their launch. They were therefore less dependent on organic growth. RENTITEM 
onboarded the supply side with the help of a sales team. This ensured that the first joiners supplied value 
units of high quality. Subsequently, the platform acquired the demand side through Google AdWords. 
The CEO underlined that it is hence easier to generate demand depending on the amount of money spent. 
LEND arranged a media-for-equity deal2. In exchange for equity, the platform advertised its business for 
free in journals published by the contracting media group. The advertising campaign addressed both 
lenders and borrowers simultaneously: “We addressed both, lenders and borrowers. Let's say the first 
week we had it dedicated to lenders, the second week we dedicated to borrowers (…).” In this case, the 
balance of both sides played a particular role: To exploit the willingness of lenders to invest the acqui-
sition of borrowers had to be adjusted accordingly. “At the beginning, we had much more lenders than 
borrowers. And so, we decided to shift the message that we were giving to the press to focus on bor-
rowers.” This zig-zag strategy allowed a balanced growth on both sides and required the trading of equity. 
Our study has several implications for theory. First, our study adds to prior conceptual work that has 
proposed several launch strategies but has rarely empirically examined the launch strategies (Eisenmann 
et al. 2006, Evans 2009, Evans and Schmalensee 2016, Parker et al. 2016). We review these launch strate-
gies and classify them according to the entry order of users and consumers. We investigate how these 
strategies were put into practice by different online start-ups. Second, we add the ability to switch be-
tween producer and consumer side as a contingency factor which impacts the entry order of users. The 
ability to switch user sides has been acknowledged by prior work. For example, Parker et al. (2016) and 
Gazé and Vaubourg (2011) recognize that on some platforms groups of producers and consumers can 
be in “perpetual reformation” (Gazé and Vaubourg, p. 159). Evans (2009) recognizes that on some plat-
forms user groups remain distinct, while on other platforms users can become part of any of the two sides 
at different points in time. Being able to switch between sides means that users may equally consume 
and produce depending on their needs, while the platform does not impose any constrains on them. 
Switching is therefore “reversible and costless” (Gazé and Vaubourg 2011, p. 159). This implies that a 
platform may serve the same agents on the two different sides of the market (Evans 2009). Although 
scholars have classified platforms according to numerous criteria, a distinction based on the ability to 
2 A media company trades advertising space in their publications to start-ups in exchange for equity. Thus, the 
start-up obtains media coverage instead of cash to increase its customer base. 
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switch user sides remains widely unexplored despite its significance for the implementation of launch 
strategies. Examples of B2B and P2P businesses with and without switching user sides can be identified 
among current existing digital platforms. By empirically exploring the contingent role of side switching 
regarding the suitability of launch strategies, our study contributes to the existing body of knowledge 
on platform characteristics, launch strategies, and the interaction between the two. 
Our study also has implications for practitioners. A platform with switching user sides faces reduced 
user acquisition costs, as the users to both sides might be the same. Once onboarded to one side, they 
already know the platform. Using the platform, they learn about the opportunity to engage with the other 
side. Intuitively, platforms with switching sides should address a user base that potentially can engage 
as both producers and consumers to maximize network effects. We saw that the micromarket strategy is 
especially suitable in the case of side-switching. Nevertheless, it decelerates the global growth of the user 
base. An established user base in location A cannot be transferred to a location B (Salminen 2014). This 
problem was also recognized by the interviewed founders: “Every time we target a new city, we start at 
zero. When someone needs an office in city X, he won’t be interested in our 70 offices in city Y” (REN-
TOFFICE1). However, to test the business model, starting at one location might be useful. Once the crit-
ical mass has been reached there, the platform can expand into several further markets simultaneously. 
Platforms without switching user sides must consider the uncertainty that arises from a sequential entry 
strategy. The first joiners do not know when and even if the second side will show up (Gazé and Vau-
bourg 2011). Therefore, a sequential entry strategy often involves an incentive for first joiners. For 
example, free premium accounts for a trial period or other material subsidies are provided to first users 
(Parker et al. 2016). These subsidies convey confidence about the success of the business and shape ex-
pectations among first joiners (Evans and Schmalensee 2016). However, if the sequence before onboard-
ing the second side is too long or even unsuccessful, the first side becomes impatient and will leave the 
platform again. One possible solution to minimize the impatience is to communicate openly when the 
platform plans to onboard the second side. 
This study is a first step toward a better understanding of launch strategies of digital platforms. Future 
research could build on our insights and explicitly conceptualize and consider the success of digital 
platforms. The dependent variable could therefore be the achievement of a critical mass, which can be 
approximated by various measures of growth. Examples are the amount of venture capital raised or the 
increase of the number of employees, both signs for predicted growth of a business (Davila et al. 2003). 
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